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CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PANEL 





MR. ZISHOLTZ: We’re going to start our final panel. This panel will be 
moderated by Ms. Karen Visser, who was gracious enough to volunteer as our 
moderator. Karen has served as a law clerk to the Honorable W. H. Drake, Jr., 
Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, since 2001. She 
graduated summa cum laude from Georgia State University College of Law in 
2000. Karen is a co-author of Bankruptcy for the General Practitioner. She is 
also an adjunct professor at Mercer University’s Walter F. George School of 
Law. Thank you for participating with us today, Karen. 
MS. VISSER: Thank you, Jeremy. It’s my pleasure to introduce the rest of our 
awesome consumer panel. To my immediate right, we have Melissa 
Youngman. Melissa is a managing attorney of McCalla Raymer’s bankruptcy 
practice in Florida. She focuses on representation of secured creditors in 
consumer bankruptcy practice. She also represents creditors in all aspects of 
insolvency, including workouts, bankruptcy, reorganizations, and assignment 
for the benefit of creditors. She received her J.D. from St. John’s University 
School of Law in 2002 and her B.A. from the University of Florida in 1998. 
While in law school, she served as an editor of the American Bankruptcy 
Institute Law Review. She also serves currently as a board member of the 
Central Florida Bankruptcy Law Association and is a former board member of 
the New York chapter of IWIRC. Welcome to Atlanta, Melissa. 
Next to Melissa we have Adam Goodman. The Office of Adam M. 
Goodman, Standing Chapter 13 Trustee, is responsible for administering 
chapter 13 bankruptcy plans here in the Northern District of Georgia for cases 
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assigned to Judge Drake, Judge Murphy and Judge Sacca. Adam is the co-
author of Chapter 13 Practice and Procedure. 
MR. GOODMAN: Go out and buy a copy. 
MS. VISSER: And at the end we have Brian Cahn, who is a partner with 
Perrotta, Cahn & Prieto, P.C. Mr. Cahn received his bachelor’s degree from the 
University of Georgia in 1991 and his J.D. from Sanford University’s 
Cumberland School of Law in 1994. He is a member of the National 
Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys and the ABI. Welcome, Brian. 
MR. CAHN: Thank you. 
MS. VISSER: We’re very glad to have you as our debtor attorney on the 
panel. 
So what we’ve done today in order to frame our discussion is give you a 
typical but hypothetical fact pattern involving a married couple who have two 
young kids and they’ve come into our office today seeking bankruptcy relief. If 
you wouldn’t mind taking about three minutes to go ahead and read through 
the hypothetical, we’ll jump into Issue 1. So just stop when you get to the part 
that says, “Issues.” 
All right. I know that you all are speed readers, so I’m going to go ahead and 
throw our first issue out to Brian. Basically, our first issue is that Donna 
Debtor has a student loan debt. And as you all know that under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8),1 the debt is presumptively non-dischargeable. And to get that debt 
discharged, the debtor is going to have to get a determination that failure to 
discharge the debt would impose an undue hardship on her and her family. So 
under Rule 7001(6),2 we’re supposed to file an adversary proceeding to get that 
determination. But Brian says that he has a friend who told him that the 
Supreme Court recently ruled that all you have to do is put language in the plan 
that says it’s discharged and get your plan confirmed. So, Brian, is that really 
what the Supreme Court said? And if so, can we just go ahead? It seems really 
easy to do that. 
MR. CAHN: Well, if you just look at the holding at the ruling,3 you’re going 
to miss the essence of the opinion. You don’t want to make the mistake of 
 
 1 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(8) (2006). 
 2 FED. R. BANK. P. 7001(6). 
 3 Mr. Cahn refers to the United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa case. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. 
v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010). 
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overreaching with plan provisions. They call it “discharge-by-declaration.” 
Now, when I first read the case and I saw that this debtor was able to discharge 
the student loan debt by virtue of a plan provision, this sounded great to me 
because the last adversary that I filed for a client that was clearly disabled was 
very much contested. It involved a two-day trial, doctors’ depositions, and it 
seemed like a cut-and-dried case to me. But after all the evidence, the judge 
said it was a close call and ultimately did give my client a discharge on his 
student loan. But these are very difficult cases to prove. The Brunner test4 is 
pretty much the universal standard. The debtor in Espinosa was able to avoid 
all of that. The debtor did not have to go to a trial. The debtor did not have to 
prove the elements under the Brunner test. He did it the easy way. 
Now, if you look at the opinion, the Supreme Court decided this case on 
very narrow procedural grounds. That was more of a due process issue. 
Because United Student Aid Funds did receive notice of the plan and, for 
whatever reason, chose not to object to it, they had waived their rights, even 
though the way the debtor did it was illegal. But the opinion warned debtors’ 
attorneys about doing it this way. Debtors’ attorneys could be looking at the 
possibility of sanctions under Rule 115 or Rule 9011,6 and that could be 
considered a bad faith litigation tactic. 
So for a student loan case, I wouldn’t touch it with a plan provision. I 
wouldn’t want to risk being on the other end of a Rule 11 or 9011 motion for 
sanctions. It’s just in practice not something that I would risk doing. But there 
are other options that may be available, may be appropriate, and those options I 
would consider. 
MS. VISSER: For example, you would perhaps try to strip a second lien 
through a plan provision without filing a motion or an adversary proceeding? 
MR. CAHN: I wouldn’t do that. 
MS. VISSER: Why? 
MR. CAHN: The reason I wouldn’t do that is because Rules 3012 and 70017 
require, respectively, either a motion or an adversary proceeding. So this is 
very much like the Espinosa situation where you are at risk of employing a bad 
 
 4 Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (articulating a three-part 
test for a finding of “undue hardship”). 
 5 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 6 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. 
 7 Id. 3012, 7001. 
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faith litigation tactic by trying to strip a second lien by virtue of a plan 
provision. So I wouldn’t suggest doing that. But there are other options that are 
less aggressive, but more common. 
One provision that I’ve incorporated into plans has been a situation where a 
client has a pawned vehicle. This is very common now with this economy. 
We’re seeing more and more clients come in with vehicles subject to a title 
pawn. Most of the times you don’t know whether that client is still within the 
redemption period, and you don’t really know what it takes to appropriately 
redeem that vehicle through a chapter 13 plan. There are a couple of cases out 
there that indicate that the debtor must take adequate affirmative steps in the 
plan to redeem that vehicle. So I hate to risk the probability of filing a plan that 
doesn’t take those appropriate affirmative steps. 
On page 130 of the materials, I incorporated a plan provision that said that 
the debtor is going to retain this vehicle by paying the title lienholder in full, 
and that confirmation of the plan shall constitute an affirmative finding that the 
grace period for redemption has not expired, that the vehicle is property of the 
estate, and that the payments in the plan to the title pawn lender do constitute 
affirmative appropriate steps to redeem that vehicle. I think that shifts the 
burden to the title pawn lender to object and tell me that these are not 
appropriate steps. 
MS. VISSER: In fact, the title pawn holder didn’t come to court, more than 
likely in that case, but someone else did. 
MR. CAHN: Yes. I believe that is a function of the Espinosa opinion. The 
Espinosa opinion shifts the burden of policing these provisions, not only to the 
debtor and the debtor’s attorney, but to the chapter 13 trustee and judges as 
well. So the creditor has to protect itself, and everybody else has to be 
proactive in policing these provisions. 
I don’t think that two years ago I would’ve had to argue this provision because 
it wouldn’t have come before the judge, but now our chapter 13 trustees have 
been instructed by the Supreme Court to police plan provisions that are 
unconventional or off the menu. So it does add more work, not only to the 
trustees but to the judges and the creditors. 
MR. GOODMAN: I actually look a little bit further back than Espinosa. I 
look to the Eleventh Circuit’s Bateman decision8 which preceded Espinosa by, 
 
 8 Universal Am. Mortg. Co. v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 331 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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I think, at least ten years. In that case, it was a case that emanated out of Miami 
regarding mortgage arrearage cures and the fact that the debtor’s plan did not 
properly address a nonmodifiable mortgage and did not propose to cure what 
the proof of claim actually provided for. The case went past confirmation and 
was actually, by the time the Eleventh Circuit decided the case, near that five-
year mark if it hadn’t already passed it. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit 
crafted relief to all the parties but instructed all the parties, pointing to the 
court, to the trustee, to the debtor’s attorney, and to the creditor, that everybody 
had a responsibility under the Code and needed to honor what the Code 
provided for. So I think the Bateman case really to me is where I’m looking 
towards, and certainly Espinosa supports obviously that same logic. 
So, as long as I’ve been trustee, I look at it as though we’ve got a model 
plan, we’ve got certain things we expect, but at the same time, if you’re going 
to, I guess, leave what we know is standard, I want to make sure that the court 
is aware of something that’s different and that we’re not accustomed to 
because I don’t want to come back in the case a year or two later, even if 
Espinosa stands in place and the party was properly served, and they’ve got no 
defense, and even if it should’ve been a void judgment. The fact of the matter 
is, it sticks and they were properly served. To me, I don’t want any judge 
looking at me and saying, “Hey, how did you let this case get confirmed with 
this provision in there that clearly should not have been confirmed?” 
Certainly in the Northern District [of Georgia], a very high volume district 
in this country, probably one of the highest, I can look every week and see 
anywhere from 80 to 200 cases up for confirmation. Obviously, the judge isn’t 
going to hear every one of those cases. And so I view it as my role to make 
sure that the plan complies with the Code in every way that we can make sure, 
certainly as the case would get to the § 341 meeting,9 and as we look at 
amendments getting towards confirmation. So we put a very heavy eye on the 
plan. 
MS. VISSER: And, Melissa, from the creditor’s perspective, do you see 
clients paying more attention to the plan provisions to ensure that they’re not 
violating § 1322(b)(5)?10 
MS. YOUNGMAN: We do. Before these cases, we always had that obligation 
anyway. The problem is, as has already been mentioned, when you have a 
 
 9 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006). 
 10 See generally id. § 1322(b)(5). 
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district that uses model plans, sometimes it just gets slipped in there and it may 
be that it’ll go by us. We absolutely have an affirmative responsibility to 
review that plan and make an objection if one is warranted. But as Brian 
mentioned, I think if a debtor’s counsel doesn’t do anything to demarcate that 
language in there so that it sticks out to the court, the trustee, and the creditor, 
then maybe they might have an ethical obligation that they’re violating. That’s 
my perspective, but we’ve always had that obligation, and now we even have it 
more because of the Espinosa decision. 
MS. VISSER: Before we leave Issue 1, do we have any questions from the 
audience? If so, if you wouldn’t mind moving to a microphone so we can hear 
you. All right, we can move on to Issue 2. 
This issue, we’re talking now about trying to figure out how much money our 
debtors are going to have to pay to their unsecured creditors. Of course, you 
are all familiar with BAPCPA11 and the addition of the means test, which 
resulted in the projected disposable income test to tell us how much to go to 
unsecured creditors, and it also tells us how long the debtors have to stay in 
their plan, three years versus five years, otherwise known as the applicable 
commitment period.12 So, Adam, would you mind starting us off to walk us 
through some of the more recent issues you’ve seen in the means testing field? 
MR. GOODMAN: Well, certainly, you’ve got Hamilton v. Lanning and the 
Ransom case coming from the Supreme Court, Lanning13 dealing with the 
income side of the equation. And then you’ve got Ransom14 dealing with the 
expense side. You could find cases all over the country that support whatever 
position you want to take regarding the means test. The cases are really all over 
the place. Certainly what I’ve experienced is that the means test does not work 
so well all the time in chapter 13 in determining what the unsecureds can 
receive or what they should receive according to the means test. 
Now I look also to the Eleventh Circuit’s Tennyson15 decision which 
determined that, even if the debtor’s means test analysis comes up to be a 
negative number, they are still required to be in the case for the sixty-month 
commitment period. I think as I look at other circuit courts that have addressed 
cases since Lanning and Ransom, they seem to be linking onto the idea that the 
 
 11 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
 12 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b), 1325(b). 
 13 Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010). 
 14 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011). 
 15 Whaley v. Tennyson (In re Tennyson), 611 F.3d 873 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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circuit court followed that ultimately BAPCPA was about having debtors who 
can pay, and that they do pay what they can afford to pay. 
So as I look at the mix between Lanning and Ransom, and then in 
Tennyson, in our circuit, I view it as though really the big thing to me is 
determining what is the debtor’s current monthly income, and you look at the 
definition under § 101(10A),16 and what has their income been for the last six 
months. Maybe not exactly the best way of looking at what the debtor should 
project forward to pay to their creditors when you look at the last six months, 
in most cases probably the worst six months of that person’s life financially, 
but that’s what we have. So I’m looking at that current monthly income, 
because that current monthly income is going to determine what that applicable 
commitment period is, whether it’s a thirty-six-month plan or a sixty-month 
plan. 
Also I think an important part of that equation is the household size. I know 
that we’re still living in the era of “Leave It To Beaver” and the very simple 
household sizes, and there’s a lot of— 
MS. VISSER: Half-children? 
MR. GOODMAN: So you’ve got a lot of flux in regard to that. But I think 
those two pieces are a very big part in determining how long the debtor’s case 
is going to last, at least, I should say, as a minimum period of time, whether 
it’s the thirty-six- or sixty-month commitment period. So in this scenario, as 
with the example, you’ve got, for example, the idea that maybe there was this 
$20,000 settlement, and is that part of the CMI. I think that falls right into the 
Lanning situation, where Ms. Lanning had received a severance package from 
her previous employer. She gets into the case, and that severance package very 
much skews what her current monthly income is to the point that, when you 
look at the numbers of her actual income versus what the means test provided, 
she just could not afford even remotely what that means test required. So when 
you’re looking at a $20,000 settlement, that’s going to be a problem for the 
debtor if you’re going to try to follow the form mathematically. There is one 
court that said early on, “you just do the math.” 
MR. CAHN: Let me switch the hypothetical up a little bit on that Lanning 
issue. Let’s assume that Donna had not yet settled her personal injury case. She 
disclosed it as an asset in her petition. She had her personal injury lawyer 
 
 16 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A). 
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appointed as special counsel, and her plan was confirmed. What happens down 
the road, postconfirmation when she settles that claim? Can I argue that that 
$20,000 is not disposable income? And I have seen some cases that answer 
that question. 
MR. GOODMAN: Are you looking at that case out of Michigan? 
MR. CAHN: Yes. I can give you a cite to that case. It just came out on 
January the 23rd. It’s In re Connor.17 This was a win for the debtor. It was a 
bankruptcy court opinion. Excuse me, it was a district court opinion. Basically 
what the opinion said is that BAPCPA significantly changed the definition of 
disposable income, and § 1325(b)(2) is now a very mechanical approach, and it 
defines disposable income as current monthly income minus these amounts 
that are reasonably necessary to be deducted from that income. But current 
monthly income is that six-month average. 
When you look at that holding in conjunction with the Lanning holding, 
Lanning said that you have to look at factors or additional income that was 
known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation. So three courts, 
including the Connor court, have looked at this issue as to whether this 
personal injury settlement postconfirmation fits the definition of disposable 
income, and it depends on whether that amount was known or virtually certain 
in the future. All three courts that have looked at it have opined that it is 
impossible to know, first of all, whether that settlement is ever going to come 
to fruition, or how much it’s going to be. And since it is relatively unknown 
under the Lanning opinion, it is not disposable income and doesn’t have to be 
paid into the plan. 
Now there may be other problems with it. It may be nonexempt, etc., but I 
see this as a win for the debtor. I think it creates a strong argument, not only to 
this scenario but other scenarios where the chapter 13 debtor comes into 
property postconfirmation. It’s going to be interesting to see how it plays out. 
MR. GOODMAN: I look at that, I guess, in a couple of different ways. One, 
are we going to narrowly determine known or virtually certain? If the person 
comes into the case and there is a cause of action that is known, you’re never 
always going to know whether it’s going to settle in the debtor’s favor or in 
one way or another resolve in the debtor’s favor. Attorneys take things on 
contingency, and they’re hoping they’re going to win; otherwise, they 
 
 17 In re Connor, 463 B.R. 14 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
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wouldn’t take the case. So I think there’s a certain expectation that the debtor 
will be successful. So I think it’s not as much narrowly interpreting what is 
known as much as the fact as when the debtor comes into the case, there is this 
known aspect out there. 
I think also I would look to the idea that you’re looking in the chapter 13 
context that it’s property of the estate still, when you’re looking at § 1306.18 If 
you’re in a district where property of the estate does not re-vest, and I’m not 
sure in this particular case whether or not—I don’t remember if the court even 
got into that aspect—but if the property re-vests in the debtor at confirmation, 
that could be a different story. In that scenario, it may be one where the trustee 
would want a plan provision that specifically references the fact that there is 
this potential asset out there and it is still part of the estate. That’s certainly 
something that may need to be considered in doing that. 
Another thing I look at, maybe just a little broadly. We’re looking at a case 
that’s coming from the Sixth Circuit. I don’t know if any party is appealing 
that case. But when I look at cases post-Lanning, the Sixth Circuit has been 
rather active in looking at chapter 13 cases. I’ve got it in the material. You’ve 
got most recently the Seafort case regarding a 401(k) loan.19 Certainly not 
identical to this scenario, but the Sixth Circuit indicated that when the debtor’s 
401(k) loan is done, that money goes toward paying the unsecured creditors. It 
cannot be used by the debtor to basically restart the 401(k). I thought it was 
interesting in footnote 7, the court states that the trustee had conceded that the 
debtor can continue to make voluntary retirement contributions. The court said 
that they didn’t agree with that assertion but, however, their view didn’t matter 
because that wasn’t an issue presently before the court. 
You’ve got the Darrohn case20 out of the Sixth Circuit also that reversed 
confirmation that was following the mechanical approach. You also have the 
Baud case21 that dealt with the debtor, following with Tennyson, that if the 
debtor’s disposable income is negative under the means test, that they’re still in 
a sixty-month commitment period. So I’d be interested to see, if that goes on 
appeal, whether it is affirmed. 
 
 18 11 U.S.C. § 1306. 
 19 Seafort v. Burden (In re Seafort), No. 10-6248, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2012). 
 20 Darrohn v. Hildebrand (In re Darrohn), 615 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 21 Baud v. Carroll, No. 09-2164, U.S. App. LEXIS 2182 (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 2011). 
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MR. CAHN: Another question. This is the B22C. It’s the means test form that 
we file in chapter 13 cases. Do you anticipate this form being modified or 
changed at all in light of the Lanning opinion? Where on this form do we put 
these significant changes or anomalies in the six-month history that Lanning 
was talking about? It seems to me that Donna’s income was artificially inflated 
by $20,000 within that six-month period of time. I don’t see a place on the 
form to reduce the CMI by that component. 
MR. GOODMAN: Unless you put it under the special circumstance, and then 
you’ve got another whole issue of whether the debtor’s situation falls into a 
special circumstance. But I think ultimately part of the problem, when you’re 
looking at the reality of somebody’s budget in comparison to the means test 
form is coming up with the number the unsecured creditors are going to 
receive if you’re going to follow a mechanical approach under the form, 
because remember, you’re looking at someone whose income on this side of 
the equation is based on their last six months’ history. You’ve got an expense 
side that deals with certain IRS standards as well as certain actual expenses, 
and then you get down to the bottom and come up with a number. I’ve seen 
plenty of folks who have tried to reconcile how this bottom line number should 
match up with what the bottom of I and J are on their schedules for income and 
expenses, I being the actual income they’re receiving at the time, and their 
actual expenses on J. It’s just not designed to be that identical. So I think 
ultimately you’ve got to look at it from a holistic standpoint when you’ve got 
someone who’s got such a variance that the form creates a comparison to 
reality and come to an agreement. 
Now, I think part of it when you’re looking at, for example with Tennyson 
and the idea that the debtor is in the case for sixty months if you’re above 
median, even if the form comes out with a negative number, in our district we 
use a base if the debtor is not paying their unsecured creditors in full. So 
effectively what you’re looking at is the plan payment times thirty-six if it’s a 
below-median debtor, or sixty times your plan payment for someone who is 
above-median. 
So in that scenario, ultimately it may not be the dividend the debtor 
proposes that is what the unsecureds receive. It may not even be the pool that 
the debtor puts in the plan, even if they can afford the number that ends up 
being in the bottom of 22C. It ultimately could be that base amount. After the 
debtor has paid the attorneys fees, the trustee’s fee, the secured creditors and 
the priority creditors, everything that’s left goes to the unsecured creditors. So 
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if the debtor ends up paying those other four items, say for example in month 
forty, there’s another twenty months that are available to pay the unsecured 
creditors, and that number could be different than what the plan provides. Our 
local form provides that the pool or the dividend can be adjusted to account for 
the applicable commitment period. 
To a great extent, that may ultimately be reality as to what you’re looking 
at, as to what the debtor can afford. Am I ultimately going to push the form if 
the debtor can’t afford that number? 
MR. CAHN: The problem that I see with putting the anomaly on line 57 is 
that we’re still filling out the entire form and it appears to push my client into a 
sixty-month commitment period. So I’m trying to reconcile filling out the 
entire form, which would imply a sixty-month commitment period with 
Lanning, which suggests that if there is an anomaly, we can exclude that and 
go for a thirty-six-month. 
MR. GOODMAN: And that’s, I guess, the tough thing. When you look at the 
definition of § 101(10A), it could be interpreted rather broadly as to what that 
income is in dealing with that aspect. So I think that’s a bit of a problem, I 
guess, for the debtor in looking at it, whether it’s a debtor who has a business, 
whether it’s a debtor who has additional income. And then, what if the debtor 
files this: you’ve got a single debtor in the case and she’s married and her 
husband doesn’t file with her—how does his income fall into the equation? Is 
it part of her CMI? There’s plenty of cases that say that the non-filing spouse’s 
income is not CMI according to the definition under § 101(10A). But at the 
same time, then you’re looking at the idea of how much is the debtor spouse 
actually contributing to the household. It’s very, very rarely that I see a debtor 
who does not commingle her income with her spouse and all their money is 
pooled together to pay the household expenses. So ultimately, even if it is a 
single filer who’s married, she is still, I think, reality-wise, going to have the 
spouse’s income as part of the equation for CMI. 
MR. CAHN: A lot of these discrepancies create absurd results. One of them, if 
we can go back to the Ransom case, involves the ownership cost that’s on the 
means test, the B22. There was a split amongst the circuits as to whether or not 
a debtor who has an unencumbered vehicle can take that $496 ownership cost. 
The Supreme Court last year ultimately decided that, and really looked at the 
purpose of BAPCPA to squeeze out as much money as they could, and said, 
this is a category of expense that was earmarked for debtors that owe money 
against their vehicles. So now I cannot take that deduction for a debtor that 
CONSUMER PANEL GALLEYSFINAL 6/8/2012 9:37 AM 
344 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28 
maybe was more responsible than another debtor. So this is an absurd result in 
some regards because the more responsible debtor that doesn’t owe any money 
against his vehicle gets punished. What would happen, and this scenario does 
come up fairly often, if I do the means test for this debtor and the end result is 
that he’s got $400 left over? That would require a significant pool to the 
unsecured creditors. If that debtor only knew that he had to go borrow $100 
against his vehicle, he could do a chapter 7 and he wouldn’t have— 
MR. GOODMAN: As long as you didn’t tell him beforehand to do that. 
MR. CAHN: Well, that’s the— 
MR. GOODMAN: And now we’re getting to Milavetz.22 
MR. CAHN: What would you do? That’s the interesting issue. That debtor has 
three options. That debtor can file a chapter 13, try to force some disposable 
income out of the budget and tough it out for sixty months. Another option is 
to do nothing. I basically tell that debtor, “I can’t help you. If you can’t afford 
this chapter 13 payment, you’re going to have to fight them on your own.” And 
the third option is that ethical quandary. If that debtor borrows $100 against his 
vehicle, all of a sudden he gets another $496 on his means test and he qualifies. 
The Supreme Court actually wrote an opinion, the Milavetz opinion. It 
comes close to telling me that I can advise that client to do that, but you’ve got 
to reconcile a couple of things. First of all, you’ve got Rule 1.3 of the Georgia 
Rules of Professional Responsibility.23 That tells me that I may take whatever 
legal and ethical measures that are required to vindicate a client’s cause and 
I’ve got to represent that client with zeal and advocacy. 
On the other hand, I’m looking at § 526(a)(4)24 because I’m a debt relief 
agent. I’ve even got a badge that says I am. 
MR. GOODMAN: Do you wear that when your clients are there? 
MR. CAHN: I haven’t. But because I am a debt relief agent, that Code section 
says that I shall not advise an assisted person or prospective assisted person to 
incur more debt in contemplation of such person filing a case under this title. 
The Milavetz case was the result of several opinions that were out there. Some 
of the opinions said that the entire concept of debt relief agents was 
 
 22 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010). 
 23 GA. RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 1.3 (2011). 
 24 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006). 
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unconstitutional. Other cases said that § 526 restricted free speech between a 
lawyer and his client. So the Milavetz case basically prohibited a certain type 
of communication between a lawyer and his client. The way I read it is that it 
is meant to restrict advice to a debtor to incur additional debt when such advice 
is tantamount to a specific type of misconduct, namely incurring debt and not 
intending to repay it. And that’s the way I read it, but still something seems 
fundamentally wrong about the whole process. Something seems wrong about 
borrowing money to qualify for chapter 13. 
MR. GOODMAN: Now, you’re talking about the process as far as the means 
test? 
MR. CAHN: Yes. 
MR. GOODMAN: Then I’ll flip it to the other way. Now you’re talking about 
the frugal debtor who was trying to do the best they could and didn’t buy a 
new car, didn’t buy the expensive house. And because they didn’t have all 
these expenses, their means test showed that they had a lot of money to be able 
to pay their creditors back, assuming they had a decent stream of income, and 
obviously they’re above median to get to the back end of the form. Then I see 
cases with the flip of the debtor who bought the $300,000–400,000 house, who 
bought the new Mercedes and the new BMW. Then when that debtor fills out 
this form, even if they have the same amount of income that Brian suggests—
we don’t know exactly what that is, but with the same amount of income as the 
debtor who was frugal—that debtor’s number is going to come up negative on 
the form. 
MR. CAHN: Every time. 
MR. GOODMAN: Every single time. And so now you do have this problem 
of two different people who have the same income and one of them comes up 
with a very huge number because they were trying to be fiscally responsible 
and maybe they had a medical issue and incurred $100,000 in medical debt, 
didn’t have insurance, and they’ve got this big problem. Then you’ve got 
someone who was spending on credit cards and buying new expensive cars and 
buying the expensive house. Same income, and if you’re going to follow the 
mechanical approach, the guy who is spending is going to get away without 
having to pay his unsecureds. While the guy Brian points out has got a form 
that says he’s got to pay. 
MR. CAHN: It’s a frustrating situation. 
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MS. VISSER: On that note, maybe we should ask for some questions about 
the means test. Do we have any in the audience? 
MR. GOODMAN: Because everybody knows everything about the means 
test. 
MS. VISSER: That’s right. And everyone agrees that it’s an unworkable test 
and frustrating. And since we can’t fix all the problems today, then we’ll move 
on to Issue 3, which basically deals with how we decide what our debtors are 
going to be able to exempt from the property in a chapter 7 case, and keep 
away from the trustee. Or if they’re filing a chapter 13 case, how much that 
will reduce the amount by which they have to pay unsecured creditors under 
the liquidation test. So, in our case, Brian, what do you think you would advise 
our debtors to do about this real estate that Donna inherited that turns out 
might be worth more than it was on the petition date? 
MR. CAHN: The fact pattern was modeled to raise a scenario that would 
involve the Schwab v. Reilly holding.25 In that opinion, the Supreme Court 
gave the debtor’s attorneys an election to choose to exempt a certain dollar 
value of property. Or if the intent is to exempt the interest in the property itself, 
there is actually a way on my software where I can click that the exemption is 
100% of the fair market value of that property. There seems to be a trend over 
the last couple of years. Opinions were coming out suggesting that, in chapter 
7 cases, postpetition appreciation in value belonged to the trustee. That might 
create an awkward incentive for the trustee to sit around, wait, see what 
happens with that property, and if it appreciates, then that appreciation would 
inure to the benefit of the estate and creditors. 
Schwab suggested that the debtor may elect to exempt 100% of the fair market 
value of the property, whatever that value was at the time of filing, and if the 
trustee doesn’t object to it, then the appreciation belongs to the debtor. So I 
have seen more and more petitions in general include 100% FMV as opposed 
to a dollar figure on the schedules. I don’t know if you see it as much in 
chapter 13 cases. 
MR. GOODMAN: Actually I have seen it several times. It’s interesting you 
point out that the software lets you make that selection, because when I get to 
the § 341 creditor meeting and I ask why they selected that, they say, “Really, 
oh, I don’t know.” And so I think that I guess the software vendor has decided 
 
 25 See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010). 
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that is a viable option. Every opinion I’ve seen since Schwab has ruled against 
the debtor and has required them to amend the exemptions, especially if you’re 
dealing in a place where it’s a dollar amount, which is what the state or the 
federal exemption provides for. 
MR. CAHN: Right. It doesn’t feel right clicking 100% FMV because we’re 
used to just a mathematical computation of fitting these exemptions within the 
dollar amounts allowed. 
One thing that I think the 100% FMV does is it actually gives a little bit more 
meaning to uncontested orders avoiding judicial liens. I know in my division, 
when an order is entered uncontested on a § 522 motion to avoid a judicial 
lien,26 it doesn’t have teeth. You don’t really know what it says. In fact, I 
looked at one of the orders that was issued in one of my cases yesterday, and 
this is what the order says: “Because the [§] 522 motion to avoid the judicial 
lien is unopposed, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that 
the lien held by the Respondent upon exempt property of the above-named 
movant is avoided to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which 
the Movant would have been entitled under [§] 522(b).” 
Now what does that mean? If I’m a real estate closing attorney and this is post-
discharge, and I see a judgment recorded but I’m handed this order, am I 
convinced that that lien is extinguished? 
MS. VISSER: To the extent it’s avoidable. 
MR. CAHN: Yes, but to what extent? So I think if you have indicated on your 
Schedule C that you have exempted 100% of the FMV of your real estate, that 
gives some clarity, and I do think that that’s an advantage at least in one 
respect. 
MS. VISSER: And we don’t have, obviously, a chapter 7 trustee here to take 
up the position of the trustee. 
MR. GOODMAN: I think ultimately what you’re really looking at, though, at 
least from my standpoint in a chapter 13 is the debtor properly disclosing what 
the value of the property is? Because now I’ve got § 1325(a)(4).27 I’ve got the 
liquidation test, and I’ve got to make sure the debtor is paying at least as much 
in a chapter 13 as what they would pay in a chapter 7. So it immediately strikes 
 
 26 11 U.S.C. § 522. 
 27 Id. § 1325(a)(4). 
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me as, hey, wait a second. The debtor has a $10,000 exemption on the house, 
$600 additional on the wild card, possibly the non-filing spouse if they’re not 
on title, another ten. 
Now I may go out and look at the value on the real property, and that may 
be a little bit of an easier analysis in looking at it, but the debtor’s household 
goods, I’m not going out to the debtor’s house and doing an inventory of 
everything they have. I’ve got anywhere from 12,000 to 13,000 cases, so 
unless I get a sense at the § 341 meeting, and after doing this for a number of 
years, I sometimes get a sense when someone’s not giving me the whole story, 
that I’m not going to go out and investigate everything. I think ultimately the 
debtor has to properly disclose all their assets and it just kind of raises a 
concern when the debtor says, “I’m exempting everything,” when the Georgia 
exemptions are a dollar amount. 
It’d be another thing if we were in Florida and it’s based upon acreage, 
whether you’re in the city or not. Then the issue there might be whether it’s the 
homestead, but Georgia is a different place. So, to me, I want to make sure the 
debtor is fully and properly disclosing things. Ultimately, as these cases come 
down after Schwab, the debtor has to provide it. I think if somebody is going to 
raise it as an issue, I’m going to ask them, “Provide me an appraisal of all your 
property and show me what everything you have is worth.” If you’re going to 
tell me you’re exempting everything, I want to know everything you have, and 
give me an appraisal. I have a duty to make sure under § 1325 that this case is 
confirmable and it meets all the elements.28 
MS. VISSER: Do we have any questions about any of the exemption issues? 
There were quite a few in there that we didn’t necessarily cover, but if anyone 
has a question about one of those, we could take a crack at it. What to do with 
proceeds of the exempt property if it’s been deposited into a bank account or 
converted into another type of asset. 
MR. CAHN: I would like to touch briefly on the new O.C.G.A. sections 
dealing with life insurance cash value and annuities. There’s been a great deal 
of buzz in the consumer bankruptcy attorney community about whether this 
statute creates an additional exemption. It’s printed in the materials. I didn’t 
write down the page number. 
 
 28 See id. § 1325. 
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In 2006, the General Assembly enacted O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c)29 and two 
other companion statutes. Section 33-25-11(c) applies to the cash surrender 
values and proceeds of life insurance policies. This is a situation that I see 
fairly often. A client will come in to see me, and they do have some cash value 
in excess of the $2,000 exemption that’s provided under the bankruptcy 
exemption statute, under § 522.30 
When you read O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c), it provides an unlimited 
exemption to the residents of Georgia in the cash value of their life insurance. 
So the question is whether that creates an additional exemption to those in 
§ 44-13-100,31 or whether it only applies to non-bankrupt individuals. 
There was reason to be excited about this because of Judge Davis’ opinion 
in the Southern District in Fullwood.32 That case is in the materials. It’s not a 
published opinion I do not believe. 
MS. VISSER: It may be mis-cited in your hypothetical as a Southern District 
of Florida case. It’s 07-41115, Southern District of Georgia, March 17, 2010. 
MR. CAHN: That’s right. And what Judge Davis was looking at was a 
different statute that was outside of the four corners of § 44-13-100. He was 
looking at a workers compensation statute under § 34-9-84.33 That statute 
basically says that workers compensation benefits are not assignable or 
attachable to or by creditors. So it appears to be exempt, but it’s not within the 
four corners of § 44-13-100. Judge Davis looked at this, and I’m quoting from 
his opinion. He says, “Not all of Georgia’s exemptions are within the four 
corners of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100.”34 So that seemed to open up the door to 
bring in this new statute with regard to cash surrender value of life insurance. 
But I think the excitement was short-lived, almost like the surrender in full 
satisfaction of vehicles’ nine-tenths claims, because as case law has 
progressed, the cases have been more restrictive on exemptions outside of 
§ 44-13-100. Specifically, the first case that looked at it was In re Allen.35 That 
dealt with an annuity. The Allen case was out of the Middle District of 
Georgia. The debtor had $25,000 from a personal injury settlement, used that 
 
 29 GA. CODE ANN. § 33-25-11(c) (2011). 
 30 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). 
 31 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-100. 
 32 In re Fullwood, 446 B.R. 634 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010). 
 33 GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-84. 
 34 In re Fullwood, 446 B.R. at 637. 
 35 In re Allen, No. 10-50827 JPS, 2010 WL 3958171 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Oct. 4, 2010). 
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money to purchase an annuity policy, and O.C.G.A. § 33-28-7 seems to fully 
exempt that. The debtor argued that based on the application of the Fullwood 
case, that should be exempt, too. The court sided with the creditor and 
disallowed the debtor’s claim of exemption. Basically the court in that opinion 
looked at the intent of the legislature in enacting that. It said in the opinion that 
for purposes of statutory construction, a specific statute will prevail over a 
general statute, and the court rejected repeal by implication. So if the 
legislature had intended to add this as an exemption to § 44-13-100, it could’ve 
done so and it would’ve done so, and that exemption was disallowed. 
The matter came back before Judge Davis in the Southern District of 
Georgia on the exact issue of the cash surrender value of insurance. Judge 
Davis distinguished his earlier holding in Fullwood—this is the case of In re 
Ryan36—and said that this new statute was in derogation of the exemption 
statute and distinguished the workers comp statute as preexisting the 
bankruptcy statutes, and they were for different purposes. In that case, Judge 
Davis said that that unlimited exemption did not apply. So it’s going to be 
interesting to see how these play out, but the trend hasn’t been as good as we 
had hoped it would be. 
MS. VISSER: Are you aware of any in the Northern District? Any decisions? 
MR. CAHN: I don’t know if there are any opinions out of the Northern 
District yet. This is a relatively new statute. It was enacted only about five or 
six years ago. 
MS. VISSER: Any questions on exemption? You guys are so talkative. We’re 
going to skip over Issue 4 and jump down to Issue 5, which will kind of 
combine with Issue 6 since we’re running a little short here. We’re going to 
talk about lien stripping. This is obviously a new issue that many of us who 
started in the 2000 time frame didn’t really understand or expect to see, 
because when we started, houses had value in excess of the first mortgage, and 
now largely they don’t. So now we have second liens that are completely 
underwater and completely unsecured. Brian’s going to explain to us what we 
might need to do in order to address that second lien. 
MR. CAHN: First of all, how do you accomplish a lien stripping action? Do 
you do it by plan provision? I think we’ve already decided that’s not a good 
idea. The question is whether to do it by a motion or by an adversary. It’s a lot 
 
 36 Roach v. Ryan (In re Ryan), No. 11-40712, 2012 WL 423854 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2012). 
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easier to do it by a motion. The key element here is complying with due 
process, making sure that service is proper. That is just critical. An adversary 
may be the safest way to go, but it is a drawn-out process. It’s a lot more 
difficult to obtain a default judgment in an adversary than it is to obtain an 
unopposed order in connection with a motion, so you have to balance these 
issues. 
MS. VISSER: And, Melissa, on your end, what kinds of issues have you 
begun seeing on your end in the mortgage industry with regard to the lien 
stripping? 
MS. YOUNGMAN: The main issues that I deal with on a daily basis are 
where a debtor is trying to modify or strip the first on the debtor’s principal 
residence. Just to take a step back, under § 506(a), a debtor can bifurcate a 
secured creditor’s claim into a secured and unsecured portion.37 So that means 
that the secured portion is going to be limited to the value of the collateral. 
Anything left over is going to be treated as unsecured. Section 1322(b) is the 
anti-modification provision in chapter 13, which states that if the claim is 
secured only by the debtor’s principal residence, then the debtor cannot modify 
that lien.38 
What happened in Nobelman,39 which was a Supreme Court decision, the 
Court said a debtor can’t bifurcate under § 506(a) a lien on a debtor’s principal 
residence, which would be a strip-down, not a strip-off, because that would 
violate § 1322(b). 
Then Tanner came along in 200040 and the court said that if there’s a junior 
lien that’s wholly unsecured, then it’s permissible for the debtor to strip off 
that lien because § 1322(b) only protects claims where there’s some security to 
protect. 
My clients, though, if we have a second and a motion to value gets filed 
and we really don’t think that there’s any possibility that we’re ever going to 
recover on that second lien, it’s really a business judgment whether we’re 
going to respond to that motion. So even though it might not technically be 
correct, I see a lot of debtors filing those motions. I see a lot of the time 
 
 37 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006). 
 38 Id. § 1322(b). 
 39 Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993). 
 40 Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000). 
CONSUMER PANEL GALLEYSFINAL 6/8/2012 9:37 AM 
352 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28 
mortgage companies aren’t responding to them because their clients aren’t 
willing to pay for it, even though maybe we have a valid defense to it. 
The other thing we see is in chapter 20 cases. For those of you who don’t 
know what a chapter 20 case is, there’s no chapter 20 in the Code, but what it 
means is a debtor who has filed a chapter 13 in the last four years prior to the 
filing of that case received a 7, 11, or 12 discharge, or in the two years 
preceding received a chapter 13 discharge. So chapter 20 comes from 7 
followed by a 13. That’s where we see it most commonly. Whether a debtor 
can strip a junior lien under that has been treated differently by different 
courts. There’s really three different lines of cases. Basically the answer is no, 
no, or in some circumstances. 
Under one line of cases, the court reviewed it and said, “Well, if we allow a 
bankruptcy debtor who’s not eligible for a discharge because of § 1328(f)41 
because they received a prior discharge in either the four- or two-year time 
period, that would be a de facto discharge of the debt, and we’re not going to 
do that, so we’re not going to allow debtors to strip this lien.” 
Some cases reach the same conclusion, but the reason that they did wasn’t 
really a de facto discharge issue; it was because they said it would be 
tantamount to allowing a debtor in chapter 7 to strip a lien, which we know 
you can’t do. The Supreme Court has expressly said you can’t do that under 
the Dewsnup decision.42 
Then there’s a third line of cases. They say, “Well, in some circumstances 
there might be a legitimate reason for the debtor to file a subsequent chapter 
13. And if there is, if it appears that this case was filed in good faith and it 
looks like the debtor is going to be able to complete their plan payments, then 
we’re going to allow them to do that.” 
So it’s sort of up in the air whether, in a chapter 20 case, it’s permissible for 
the debtor to strip a junior lien. I can tell you in Florida, most of our courts 
have said, “No, it’s a de facto discharge basically and we’re not going to let 
that happen.” 
MR. CAHN: Melissa, let me ask you a question. Let’s assume that you and I 
are on opposite ends of a case. I represent a debtor who is entitled to a 
discharge, who has filed a motion or adversary to strip off your client’s wholly 
 
 41 See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f). 
 42 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). 
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unsecured second mortgage, but it’s a close call. It would be my appraiser 
versus your appraiser, and we don’t know who is going to win, and we decide 
let’s make a deal. Can we even do that? Let’s say we decide to fund your 
client’s $50,000 unsecured creditor to the extent of $10,000 through the plan. 
Since the Tanner opinion says that the debtor can strip off a wholly unsecured 
second mortgage, would that be even a legal consent judgment? I don’t know. 
I’ve never had one issued or kicked back. It’s an interesting issue that I haven’t 
seen come up. 
MS. YOUNGMAN: It is an interesting issue. I haven’t litigated it, but I can 
tell you that I have reached deals like that where we’ve reached a deal on a 
second lien where it was questionable, and the court didn’t really dispute it, I 
guess because we had a deal and it was going to benefit the debtor. But I 
haven’t seen it litigated yet. 
MR. GOODMAN: Now, I wonder. If Brian’s appraisal is a good one, and I 
wanted to ask you a question about what if the debtor is using Zillow or some 
internet website, whether your client has an issue. But just to get back to this 
settlement agreement. Now, what if this lien could be stripped off and your 
client doesn’t fully disagree with it but is willing to make a deal just to get 
something, and all of a sudden that could negatively impact the other 
unsecured creditors because there’s this money that could go to them. So now 
do I interject myself into the situation because now you’re negatively 
impacting the other creditors of this estate? 
MR. CAHN: These issues have all really come to the forefront with the 
decline of the real estate market. I’m filing ten times as many motions to strip 
an unsecured second lien as opposed to a few years ago, so these issues are 
really starting to come to the forefront. 
MS. YOUNGMAN: Definitely. I would say in seven out of my ten chapter 13 
cases we have these motions filed, so it’s very common. 
MR. GOODMAN: Let me get back to the idea because, Brian, you were 
talking about a battle of the appraisers. I occasionally see that but not very 
often. A lot of times, I see the county’s tax assessment attached to the motion 
or I see they’re referencing Zillow or they’re referencing Eppraisal or some 
other website. Does the mortgage company take that into consideration? What 
do they think when they see not a good, hard appraisal attached to that motion? 
MS. YOUNGMAN: It is extremely common for us to see either a Zillow or a 
county tax appraisal, or the debtor just attaches an affidavit saying, “In my 
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opinion, I believe that the fair market value of my property is three dollars.” 
Courts in the Middle District have said the debtor can rely on that. Is that 
credible evidence when I come in with an actual appraisal? No. So I’m 
probably going to win. What usually happens is the motion gets filed, there’s a 
Zillow or just the debtor saying, “This is what I believe the value to be.” I file a 
response. If there’s enough time, I’ll file a response with an actual appraisal 
attached, and then we settle. It hardly ever goes to an evidentiary hearing. If it 
does, the court has to then make a decision about whose appraisal is more 
credible, and that’s going to come down to what comparable sales they looked 
at, how recent were those sales, and how realistic is the actual appraisal. 
MS. VISSER: Great. Do we have any questions before we wrap up on lien 
stripping? We did also include some information in the materials about new 
Rule 3002(1).43 So if anyone has a burning question about application of the 
rule or how the creditors are handling that, for Melissa, we could take that as 
well. And apparently that is not as interesting as lunch. It looks like we’re 
done. 
MS. MIKHAIL: Please join me in giving a hand to our Consumer Panel. 
 
 
 43 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002.1. 
